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I.

INTRODUCTION

“[T]he 21st century is being marked by people on the
move . . . But, ladies and gentlemen, the complexity of today’s displacement goes well beyond the asylum-migration nexus . . . [F]or
each centimeter the sea level rises, there will be one million more
displaced.”1
As climate change intensifies, countries around the world are
witnessing its devastating effects.2 However, the impacts of climate change go far beyond images of melting ice caps and extreme
weather headlines. Climate change is affecting the very nature of
human movements in a way that is becoming “the greatest threat
to human rights in the 21st century.”3
Over the past decade, the risk of climate-induced displacement
has reached critical levels, resulting in an emerging pattern of migration that will continue to increase at exponential levels.4 According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s 2015
Global Estimates Report, between 2008 and 2014, an average of
1.
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Opening Statement by Mr. António
Guterres, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, at the Fifty-Eighth Session of the Exec.
Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme (ExCom), Geneva, (Oct. 1, 2007),
https://perma.cc/PJ2G-PZDP [hereinafter Guterres].
2.
Jonathan Urry, Climate Change and Society, in WHY THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES MATTER 45, 52–53 (Johnathan Michie & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2015)
(highlighting a three-fold increase in storm and flood events and using ‘state’ to
mean ‘nation’ or ‘country’”).
3.
See Matthias Mueller, Climate Change: The Greatest Threat to Human Rights in the 21st Century, UNIV. COLL. LONDON: GLOB. GOVERNANCE INST.
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/VE2P-AMT6; Climate Change – The Greatest
Threat to Human Rights in the 21st Century, WORLD FUTURE COUNCIL (July 6,
2016), https://perma.cc/96EF-Z7KX [hereinafter Climate Change Threat].
4.
Jeff Turrentine, Climate Change Is Already Driving Mass Migration
Around the Globe, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/HQ6K-S5V3.
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26.4 million people were displaced by climate-related disasters annually.5 To put this figure into perspective, if the climate displaced
persons during that period formed a new country, it would be the
fourth largest in the world, close behind the population of the
United States.6 In 2017, while one person was displaced due to
armed conflict every two seconds,7 climate-related disasters displaced one person every second.8 With each passing year, the number of people displaced by climate-related events will continue to
rise.9
It is estimated that by 2050 there will be more than 200 million people displaced by climate change worldwide.10 This is eight
times the number of refugees currently under the U.N. Office of
the High Commissioner for Refugees’ (“UNHCR”) protection, and
three times the total number of forcibly displaced people accounted
for in 2017.11 By the end of the century, if countries maintain a
“business-as-usual” approach to climate change regulation, the

5.
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., GLOBAL ESTIMATES 2015:
PEOPLE DISPLACED BY DISASTERS 20 (2015), https://perma.cc/3ENU-PMVZ.
6.
Gulrez Shah Azhar, Climate Change Will Displace Millions in Coming
Decades. Nations Should Prepare Now to Help Them, THE CONVERSATION (Dec.
18, 2017), https://perma.cc/7T6V-Z64P.
7.
Forced Displacement Above 68m, New Global Deal on Refugees Critical, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Jun. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/H7TF4H7N.
8.
Climate Victims – Every Second, One Person is Displaced by Disaster,
RELIEFWEB (Jul. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/VS78-WF26.
9.
JOANNA APAP, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., THE
CONCEPT OF ‘CLIMATE REFUGEE’: TOWARDS A POSSIBLE DEFINITION 1 (2019),
https://perma.cc/26B9-HDLM; see generally Lin Taylor, One Person Every Second
Displaced by Conflict, Disaster in 2016 - Report, REUTERS (May 22, 2017),
https://perma.cc/4LMF-AKDU (discussing the displacement of millions of Chinese
and Philippine citizens due to climate-related weather events that will continue
as global temperatures warm).
10.
See Migration, Climate Change and the Environment: A Complex
Nexus, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, https://perma.cc/XC9U-FYQF (citing 200 million as the most common estimate, although figures range from 25 million to one
billion); accord Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World:
Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOB.
ENVTL. POL. 60, 68 (2010) (stating that although various projections have been
cited by different sources, this figure is the most widely cited one.).
11.
U.N. Figures at a Glance, supra note 8 (noting that in 2015 alone,
over nineteen million people were subject to climate-induced displacement).
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world will witness a 200% increase in asylum applications.12 As a
result, states will have no choice but to change their approach to
forcibly displaced people and begin to recognize the protections
they will require.13
Part II of this Article begins with a case study of the Pacific
Island nations of Tuvalu and Kiribati. Small island nations are
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change through rising sea
levels and land degradation.14 Here, the Teitiota family will be introduced as one example of the thousands of island nation residents who are subject to climate-induced displacement and have,
in turn, become climate-displaced peoples (“CDPs”).15 This section
will define CDPs and explore the multidimensional categories of
climate displacement.16

12.
John Abraham, Study Finds that Global Warming Exacerbates Refugee Crises, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/696S-DFEC; see generally Anouch Missirian & Wolfram Schlenker, Asylum Applications Respond to
Temperature Fluctuations, 358 SCI. 1610, 1610 (2017), https://perma.cc/48GAZWYR.
13.
Roberta Cohen & Megan Bradley, Disasters and Displacement: Gaps
in Protection, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 95, 95–96 (2010),
https://perma.cc/X658-LL9L.
14.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, https://perma.cc/88NV-KJ9Z
(recognizing in its preamble that small island countries are especially vulnerable
to floods, drought and desertification); see also Elizabeth G. Hanna & Lachlan
McIver, Small Island States – Canaries in the Coal Mine of Climate Change and
Health, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL HEALTH 181 (Colin Butler ed., 2016) (analyzing the unique vulnerabilities of small island states and describing small island states as “canaries in the coal mine of climate change.”); see, e.g., DAVID
HODGKINSON ET AL., ‘THE HOUR WHEN THE SHIP COMES IN’: A CONVENTION FOR
PERSONS DISPLACED BY CLIMATE CHANGE 1–2 (2010), https://perma.cc/GW87Z3AU (identifying the Maldives as a particularly “fragile” island vulnerable to the
effects of climate change as more than 80% of the island is less than one meter
above sea level).
15.
See HODGKINSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 1–2 (recognizing the rising
numbers of CDPs around the world); APAP, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that in the
last decade, in the Pacific island nations of Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu, one in
ten people have migrated due to the effects of climate change).
16.
Many terms such as “climate migrants,” “climate displaced persons,”
and “climate refugees” have been used in the scholarly literature. See generally
HODGKINSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 13 (recognizing persons displaced by climate
change as climate change displaced persons) . . . In this Article, individuals subject to climate-induced displacement will be referred to as CDPs. This term is
more inclusive and comprehensive, and more accurately reflects the multifaceted
challenges these individuals face.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3

4

2019]

Climate Displaced Peoples in the 21st Century

265

Although thousands of small island nation residents, like the
Teitiota family, have or will become CDPs, they are left without
any effective legal mechanisms to protect their rights.17 Part III
addresses applicable international and regional law instruments
and analyzes the gaps in the existing legal framework. One of the
many reasons why existing legal mechanisms fall short in effectively protecting the rights of CDPs is their failure to recognize the
complex multidimensional nature of climate-induced displacement.18 Existing legal frameworks address the initial stages of climate displacement but fail to acknowledge the long-term consequences of displacement.19
Part IV of this Article argues that rather than relying on international agreements to address this multi-casual issue, the focus should shift to strengthening regional approaches to combat
climate-induced displacement. Utilizing a bottom-up approach,
these efforts would capitalize on the unique capacities of each state
and acknowledge that regions will experience climate displacement differently.20 Examples like the Nansen Initiative and its successor, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, highlight the great
potential regional strategies offer to address climate displacement
and protect the rights of CDPs.21 In addition, this Part will explore

17.
Rana Balesh, Submerging Islands: Tuvalu and Kiribati as Case
Studies Illustrating the Need for a Climate Refugee Treaty, 5 BARRY U. ENVTL. &
EARTH L.J. 78, 81 (2015) (citing Jeremy Kelley, Climate Change and Small Island
Stats: Adrift in a Raising Sea of Legal Uncertainty, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 2, 56 (2011)); see generally COSMIN CORENDEA, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE
SINKING ISLAND REFUGEES (2016) (analyzing protection gaps in international law
for protecting climate displaced peoples in Pacific island nations and recognizing
that Pacific island nations are especially vulnerable to climate change impacts
and have limited adaptation options).
18.
Jane McAdam, Building International Approaches to Climate
Change, Disasters, and Displacement, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 1, 9
(2016), https://perma.cc/TC9W-LS4B; see also Marissa S. Knodel, Wet Feet Marching: Climate Justice and Sustainable Development for Climate Displaced Nations
in the South Pacific, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 127, 153 (2012) (describing protection
gaps for CDPs in international law as a “legal vacuum.”).
19.
See Angela Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change
Refugees in International Law, 30 L. & POL’Y 502, 508–14 (2008).
20.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 3–4, 10.
21.
APAP, supra note 9, at 7.
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the unique yet important role that the UNHCR can play in developing regional approaches to combating climate displacement.22
For states to develop effective regional policies to address climate displacement, a specialized funding mechanism will be necessary. Using the Green Climate Fund (“GCF”)23 as a model, Part
IV also calls for the GCF to recognize climate displacement as a
focus area for funding purposes. It proposes that, among the funding that is allocated to GCF’s Readiness and Preparatory Support
Program,24 a portion of these funds should be designated to support
regional solutions to address climate displacement. Through collaboration between UNHCR and the GCF, states would receive the
support they require to fund bottom-up approaches to protect the
rights of CDPs and address their unique climate displacement
needs.
II.

THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATURE OF
CLIMATE-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

A. Tuvalu and Kiribati: The Case of the Teitiota
Family
Tuvalu is an island nation located in the South Pacific Ocean,
midway between Hawaii and Australia.25 This Polynesian island

22.
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTERS AND
DISPLACEMENT 29 (Guy S. Goodwin & Jane McAdam eds., 2017),
https://perma.cc/EN5S-FG8D [hereinafter Goodwin-Gill & McAdam].
23.
Who We Are: About the Fund, GREEN CLIMATE FUND,
https://perma.cc/GE9Q-B9UC [hereinafter Green Climate Fund]. Adopted in 2011
by the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the GCF is
a collaborative funding mechanism between states and various UN agencies
working together to assist in financing mitigation and adaptation projects to combat climate change.
24.
GREEN CLIMATE FUND, READINESS AND PREPARATORY SUPPORT
GUIDEBOOK: ACCESSING THE READINESS AND PREPARATORY SUPPORT PROGRAMME OF
THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND: AN INTRODUCTION AND HOW-TO GUIDE 4 (2018),
https://perma.cc/UJ57-DUHF [hereinafter Readiness and Preparatory Support
Program]. The GCF Readiness and Preparatory Support Program (“RPSP”) was
established to support and assist developing countries to gain greater access to
GCF resources by prioritizing funding for countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
25.
Balesh, supra note 17, at 84.
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nation consists of three reef islands and six island atolls, comprising a total of twenty-six square kilometers.26 Known as one of the
world’s lowest-lying countries, Tuvalu’s elevation ranges from five
meters to less than one meter above sea level.27 As climate change
intensifies, Tuvalu faces a serious threat from increasing sea levels.28 It is estimated that by the end of the century, Tuvalu will
experience a rise of one to two meters in sea level, which will result
in total inundation of the island.29 As a result, Tuvalu (and its
11,000 residents) has become one of the first countries in the world
to face the prospect of forcible relocation due to climate change.30
Tuvalu is just one example of the several Pacific Island nations
facing total inundation.31 Kiribati, another Pacific Island nation located south of Hawaii, is also projected to face a similar fate.32 As
sea levels continue to rise, Kiribati is estimated to be completely
submerged by 2050.33 Like Tuvalu, many Kiribati residents are attempting to seek refuge elsewhere while their governments declare
states of emergency in response to climate change impacts.34 These

26.
Id.; Aram Kamali, Climate Refugees: Exposing the Protection Gap in
International Law, CLIMATE INSTITUTE (Aug. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZV8ADJXX.
27.
Kamali, supra note 26.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Kent Tukeli, Disappearing Tuvalu: First Modern Nation to Drown?,
WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/DR7Q-SASC; accord, Greg Harman,
Has the Great Climate Change Migration Already Begun?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
15, 2014), https://perma.cc/PR4H-AGBQ; Nick Noack, Has the Era of the ‘Climate
Change Refugee’ Begun?, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/UNR7A453.
31.
See Darren James, Lost at Sea: The Race Against Time to Save the
Carteret Islands from Climate Change, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://perma.cc/56AL-WL6W (discussing [t]he Carteret Islands that are located
in the South Pacific off the coast of Papua New Guinea. Originally projected to be
submerged by 2015, the Carteret Islands are currently 1.5 meters above sea level
with a total land area of 0.5 square kilometers. As it continues to sink, it is estimated that the Carteret Islands will be underwater by 2020); Katherine Butler,
14 Islands Threatened by Climate Change, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Jan. 10,
2018), https://perma.cc/M5ZZ-GGLG (listing 14 island nations at risk of inundation due to the impacts of climate change and rising sea levels); accord Knodel,
supra note 18, at 147.
32.
Balesh, supra note 17, at 80.
33.
Id.
34.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 7.
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island nations are bracing for a climate-related disaster that will
result in thousands being forcibly displaced.35
The Teitiota family is one example of vulnerable island nation
residents who are finding themselves at risk of being displaced. 36
Originally from Kiribati, the Teitiota family relocated to New Zealand in 2007, where they stayed until their visas expired in 2010.37
Faced with the threat of deportation, the family applied for refugee
status.38 Ioane Teitiota, his wife, and their three children sought
refugee protection on the basis of “changes to [their] environment
in Kiribati caused by sea-level-rise associated with climate
change.”39 Five years later, and after several lower court dismissals, this case found its way to the Supreme Court of New Zealand.40 The Supreme Court upheld all lower court decisions and
denied the family refugee status.41 The Court held that the Teitiota
family’s claim for protection was inconsistent with the definition of
“refugee” within existing refugee law.42 Despite fearing for the
safety of his family if forced to return to their submerging island
nation, Ioane Teitiota and his family were returned to Kiribati.43
Though the family was unsuccessful in securing protection as refugees, their attempt gained considerable media attention, as newspaper publications around the world began recognizing the Teitiota family as the “World’s First Climate Change Refugee[s].”44

35.
Id. at 9.
36.
Kamali, supra note 26; see also Jon Letman, Rising Seas Give Island
Nation a Stark Choice: Relocate or Elevate, NAT. GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/8M5D-QZUY.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
KELLY BUCHANAN, NEW ZEALAND: “CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEE” CASE
OVERVIEW 1, 3 (2015), https://perma.cc/93JW-ELCE.
40.
Id.
41.
Kamali, supra note 26; see generally AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT
800413 (Immigration and Protect. Trib.) at [97–98] per Burson B.L. (providing a
detailed overview of the judicial history of the Teitiota family’s case).
42.
Kamali, supra note 26 (“environmental migrants can still ‘rely on the
protection of their national government’”).
43.
Tim McDonald, The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change
Refugee, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/4TU6-AD9H; see also Robert
McLeman, Who Will Become the World’s First Climate Change Refugee?, GLOBE &
MAIL (May 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/97QP-NPXE.
44.
McDonald, supra note 43; McLeman, supra note 43.
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Despite the international community’s nascent recognition of
climate displaced peoples, the Teitiota family is not alone in seeking refugee protection for climate displaced peoples.45 In fact, between 2000 and 2015 alone, more than twenty cases were brought
before New Zealand and Australian courts by Tuvalu and Kiribati
island residents.46 Each applicant sought refugee protection from
the impacts of climate change, and all claims were denied.47
B. Defining Climate Displaced Peoples
Human migration as a response to changes in the environment
is not a new concept.48 Angela Williams, a New Zealand lawyer and
former law professor at the University of Sussex, explains that
since the beginning of human civilization, environmental factors
such as seasonal change and depletion of agricultural crops and
natural resources have historically compelled populations to relocate to new areas.49 However, as climate change has intensified, so
have the reasons for human migration.50 It was not until the 1980s
that the impacts of a rapidly changing climate on human migration
began to be recognized at the international level,51 and the concept
of CDPs began to materialize.52
Climate displaced peoples can be defined as:
persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of
sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their

45.
See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 39, at 7 (discussing several unsuccessful climate displacement cases).
46.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 5.
47.
Id.
48.
Williams, supra note 19, at 507.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 502.
51.
Id. at 506; see, e.g., Fabrice Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee:
How to Face Environmental Migration? A publication series of U.N. UNIV. INST.
FOR ENV’T & HUMAN SEC. 10–11 (2007) (noting that the connection between climate change and migration was formally recognized by the United Nations Environment Programme in 1985).
52.
Williams, supra note 19, at 506.
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homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and
who move either within their country or abroad.53

This definition acknowledges the multidimensional nature of
climate-induced displacement and recognizes the many factors
that can cause this type of displacement.54 Some of these factors
can include the CDPs’ reasons for migration, duration of migration,
and migration in relation to state borders.55 Reasons for migration
may include land degradation, water scarcity, or rising sea levels
(like the case of Tuvalu and Kiribati).56 Duration of migration will
depend on whether the choice to relocate will be temporary, longterm, or permanent.57 All of these factors are essential to consider
when attempting to define CDPs.58
CDPs may experience sudden environmental changes, also
known as “sudden-onset disasters,” as well as “[s]low-onset processes.”59 Each type of event will result in different consequences
and affect the nature and degree of the decision to migrate.60 CDPs
who experience “sudden-onset disasters” such as a tsunami may
become “temporarily displaced due to temporary environmental
stress but [seek to] return to their homes once the area has been
rehabilitated.”61 For example, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was
an extreme “sudden-onset” climate event that displaced over five
million people in 11 different countries in Asia and Africa.62 Many

53.
Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 17. Although this definition provided by the International Organization for Migration refers to “environmentally
displaced peoples,” the elements of this definition appropriately identify the multifaceted challenges that CDPs face. Thus, the same definition will be referred to
in this article to characterize CDPs.
54.
Williams, supra note 18, at 507.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
See generally Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a
Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees,
10 GLOB. ENVTL. POLITICS 60, 62–63 (2010), https://perma.cc/5G79-27QD.
59.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 3.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.; Williams, supra note 19, at 506.
62.
Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 96; McAdam, supra note 18, at
3. Note that terms such as “slow-onset processes” and “slow-onset events” may be
used interchangably, and “sudden-onset disasters” are synonymous with “sudden
impacts.”
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victims of this “sudden-onset” climate event were temporarily displaced until homes were rebuilt, and communities rehabilitated.63
In contrast, those who experience “slow-onset processes” include those who migrate “in search of a better quality of life as a
result of progressive degradation of environmental resources.”64
Residents like the Teitiota family of Pacific island nations such as
Tuvalu and Kiribati would fall under this category. However,
“[s]udden impacts” and “slow[-]onset events” are not mutually exclusive categories; they are intrinsically linked and cannot easily
be separated.65 These events can be so intertwined that it has
prompted scholars like McAdam to argue that there is “no such
thing as a ‘natural’ disaster” because “disasters are always contingent on underlying, social, economic, political, and environmental
factors.”66 Moreover, the implications of these disasters are not
confined to state borders.67 As climate change continues, its impacts will create transboundary concerns.68
As a result, defining and categorizing CDPs is a difficult and
complex task as the causes of climate-induced displacement are
multidimensional in nature.69 Thus, “this range of varied interpretations and consideration of different factors highlights many of
the key challenges with the characterization and implementation
of [this] concept[.]”70 The multidimensional nature of CDPs is one
of the many reasons why residents such as the Teitiota family have
difficulty seeking protection under existing legal mechanisms.
63.
Alan Taylor, Ten Years Since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/YY5Z-BM83 (illustrating “before and
after” images of tsunami-affected communities in Indonesia and Thailand).
64.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 3; Williams, supra note 19, at 506.
65.
Andrea C. Berringer, Migration and Climate Change: Global Governance Regimes and the Incorporation of Climate Change Displacement, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL POLICY REGIMES: TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL
LEGITIMACY 204 (Timothy Cadman ed., 2013), https://perma.cc/SNG5-RGQR.
66.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 3.
67.
Richard Hill, Climate Change, Population Movements and Governance: Case Studies in Response Mechanisms, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL
POLICY REGIMES: TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 190 (Timothy Cadman ed.,
2013), https://perma.cc/EA5E-524D (“national borders [are] becoming increasingly irrelevant . . . since rising temperatures and sea levels impact all nations”).
68.
Id.; see infra Part IV for an analysis of the distinction between internal displacement and cross-border displacement caused by climate-related
events.
69.
See Williams, supra note 19, at 507.
70.
Id.
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THE VOID IN THE EXISTING LEGAL
FRAMEWORK

The Teitiota family’s claim for protection failed because they
were seeking to be recognized as refugees.71 This claim, and ultimately all of the others brought between 2000 and 2015, were denied because none of these claims were covered under any internationally recognized definition of “refugee.”72 This Part describes
the existing international and regional legal mechanisms under
which climate displaced peoples may seek protection. It will also
highlight why these legal mechanisms fail to provide adequate protection for CDPs.73
A. International
1.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

Adopted in 1951, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) defines the term “refugee” and is recognized as “the basic and universal instrument relating to the status of refugees.”74 The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as:
someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of
origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his

71.
BUCHANAN, supra note 39; see generally Jane McAdam, The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement,
3 MIGRATION STUD. 131, 133 (2015), https://perma.cc/SBA7-CUWK.
72.
Williams, supra note 19, at 508–11; see also McAdam, supra note 18,
at 4.
73.
Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349,
357 (2009) (explaining that no legal mechanism currently exists that effectively
includes CDPs as a category of peoples who require protection against displacement).
74.
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa Preamble, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45,
https://perma.cc/MRS4-T7HW [hereinafter OAU Convention on Refugees].
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nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country. . .75

Central to the definition of a refugee under the Refugee Convention is the existence of a causal connection between the fear of
persecution and one of the five enumerated grounds.76 Also known
as the Nexus Clause, an individual seeking refugee protection
must demonstrate that they have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons based on a Convention ground.77 In addition,
the individual must be outside of their country of origin and unable
or unwilling to return due to their fear of persecution.78
The Refugee Convention’s initial interpretation of refugee was
intended to respond to the conflict-induced displacement crisis occurring in Europe following World War II.79 For this reason, the
definition of a refugee was “limited in scope to persons fleeing
events occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951.”80 Since the
Refugee Convention was drafted as a “post-Second World War instrument,”81 some have argued that the original intent of the Refugee Convention was to protect only those whose political and civil
rights had been violated.82
The first and only amendment to the Refugee Convention appeared in the 1967 Protocol, which removed the temporal and geographic restriction, and expanded this definition to provide “universal coverage.”83 Almost seven decades later, the Refugee

75.
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1,
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, https://perma.cc/B6Z4-NHBT [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
76.
Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause
in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 266 (2002).
77.
Id.
78.
Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 362.
79.
Heather Alexander & Johnathan Simon, “Unable to Return” in the
1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change, 26 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 531, 556 (2014) (explaining that the intention of drafting the Refugee Convention was to address the plight of persons fleeing persecution after the World War
II) [hereinafter Alexander & Simon].
80.
Id. at 559.
81.
Refugee Convention, supra note 75, at 2.
82.
Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 362.
83.
Id.

13

274

Pace Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 36

Convention has 145 State parties, and it is understood as the “centerpiece of international refugee protection.”84
2.

The Nexus Clause Conundrum

Although the Refugee Convention expanded the definition of
refugee by removing its temporal and geographic restrictions, it
still maintains a narrow interpretation, one that falls short of effectively protecting the rights of CDPs.85 The reason for this shortcoming is the requirement to establish a nexus between persecution and an enumerated Convention ground.86 Without the
existence of this causal connection, an individual would not be entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention.87 While climaterelated disasters can be harmful and at times fatal, cases under
the Refugee Convention have concluded that these events “do not
meet the [legal] threshold of ‘persecution,’ which normally requires
human agency.”88 Thus, the Nexus Clause in the definition of refugee excludes potential climate-related threats.89 As a result, the
Refugee Convention does not acknowledge climate-induced displacement, nor does the scope of its protection extend to CDPs.90
Additionally, the UNHCR has been reluctant to categorize
CDPs as “refugees” and neglects to acknowledge the inclusion of
climate-related events within the traditional Convention framework.91 This resistance stems from a fear that such inclusion “will
84.
Id.; see U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], States Parties to
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, at
1 (2015), https://perma.cc/LTG8-2CGU (listing State Parties as of Apr. 2015).
85.
See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357.
86.
See generally Foster, supra note 76 (analyzing the causation standard established in refugee law between persecution and the enumerated Convention grounds).
87.
See id.
88.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 4; see also Berringer, supra note 65, at
204 (noting the difficulty in identifying the causal links between climate change,
persecution and human agency).
89.
See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357–58; see also Knodel,
supra note 18, at 138–39.
90.
Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357–58; see also GoodwinGill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 29.
91.
See NINA HALL, DISPLACEMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MOVING BEYOND THEIR MANDATES 59 (Thomas G.
Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson eds., 2016) (referring to U.N. Secretary General Guterres’s concern regarding the UNHCR adopting the term “climate refugee”); see
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complicate and confuse the organization’s efforts to protect the victims of persecution and armed conflict”92 because climate-induced
displacement cannot easily be separated from the various social
and political grounds that the Refugee Convention considers.93
Consequently, climate change has intersectional implications that
can act as a “strategic security threat that sits alongside others like
terrorism and state-on-state conflict[.]”94 Accordingly, “[t]he impacts of climate change or disasters do not cause displacement on
their own but, rather, interact with other economic, social, and political drivers that themselves affect migration[.]”95 Thus, the impacts of climate change may exacerbate other security threats.96
This can create additional state pressures and increase social, political, and economic instability, which may ultimately lead to
armed conflict.97 In turn, these interrelated pressures may drive
people to flee.98
Climate change impacts are often interconnected with various
social and political issues, which makes it difficult to separate con-

also Betsy Hartmann, Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse, 22 J. INT’L DEV. 233, 238 (2010).
92.
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Statement at Nansen Conference
on Climate Change and Displacement’ (June 6, 2011), https://perma.cc/25ZVMQT6 [hereinafter Statement at Nansen Conference].
93.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 3 (considering climate change a “threat
amplifier”); see also Knodel, supra note 18, at 144 (recognizing that the incorporation of ‘“environmental’” into the definition of ‘“refugee’” is controversial because a direct causal link between climate change—as something independent
from political and economic changes—and displacement is not easily discernible”);
see generally, François Gemenne, Commentary, Climate Migrants are Refugees –
Not Commodities, 33 THE ENVTL. F. 56, 56 (2016) (analyzing the distinction between “refugee” and “migrant” and asserting that “environmental migrants” are
also non-conventional “political refugees”).
94.
Damian Carrington, Climate Change Will Stir ‘Unimaginable’ Refugee Crisis, Says Military, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/Z6PXBFPG.
95.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 3.
96.
Carrington, supra note 94.
97.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 3; Onita Das, Climate Change and Armed
Conflict: Challenges and Opportunities for Maintaining International Peace and
Security Through Climate Justice, in CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL
AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 411, 416 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016)
(explaining that climate change is a “threat multiplier” that exacerbates the risk
of security threats).
98.
Berringer, supra note 65, at 202–03.
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ventional conflict-induced displacement with climate-induced displacement.99 This creates increasing difficulty to categorize CDPs
for rights-based protection100 and highlights that the simple inclusion of climate-related events within the traditional Refugee Convention framework does not address the multidimensional and intersectional challenges that CDPs face.101
B. Regional
1.

Organization for Africa Unity and Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees

Regional protection regimes such as the Organization for Africa Unity (“OAU”) Convention on Refugees and the Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees subsequently expanded the definition of
“refugee.”102 This expanded definition acknowledges that a fear of
persecution is not the only reason for individuals to flee their country of origin.103 For example, the OAU Convention, was adopted in
1969 and acknowledged that:
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing
to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of
his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another
place outside his country of origin or nationality. 104

99.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 6.
100.
Id. at 5.
101.
Williams, supra note 19, at 509.
102.
Refugee Convention, supra note 75, at 4.
103.
OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 71, at art. 1; Gillian
McFadyen, The Contemporary Refugee: Persecution, Semantics and Universality,
SPECIAL ISSUE: THE 1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION - 60 YEARS ON 9, 19 (2012) (describing the OAU Convention on Refugees as the “first ‘salient challenge’ to the
idea that persecution is the fundamental criteria for refuge”).
104.
OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 74, at art. 1, ¶ 2.
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Likewise, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted in
1984, recognizes that “it is necessary to consider enlarging the concept of a refugee[.]”105 It provides:
[T]he definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for
use in the region is one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes
among refugees persons who have fled their country because
their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.106

As reflected in these definitions, the regimes of the OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expand the definition of “refugee” to those who have been subject to “events seriously
disturbing public order[.]”107 According to Cohen and Bradley,
“[g]iven the propensity of natural disasters to seriously disturb the
public order, environmentally displaced persons who have crossed
international borders could potentially be counted as refugees under this definition.”108 Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expands this definition further to include events that cause
“massive violation[s] of human rights.”109 McAdam argues that forcibly returning an individual to a disaster-affected area can constitute a mass violation of human rights because it would “expose
them to a real risk of death or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”110 As a result, these regional instruments offer a broader

105.
Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central
America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees art. 3, ¶ 3
(Nov. 22, 1984), https://perma.cc/M2NX-JE93 [hereinafter Cartagena Declaration
on Refugees].
106.
Id.
107.
OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 74, at art. 1, ¶ 2; see also
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, supra note 105, at art. 3, ¶ 3.
108.
Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 106.
109.
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, supra note 105, at art. 3, ¶ 3.
110.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 5-6; see also McDonald, supra note 43
(describing the fear that Mr. Ioane Teitiota has for his family’s life, the article
cites him as stating, “I’m the same as people who are fleeing war. Those who are
afraid of dying . . . The sea level is coming up, and I will die, like them. It will
affect my life when the sea takes over my land. It will kill me and my family.”).
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definition of the term “refugee” that arguably include protection for
CDPs.111
Nonetheless, despite this expanded scope of protection, neither framework explicitly mentions climate-induced displacement
or the adverse implications of climate change. Although it is possible for climate-related events to “seriously disturb[] public order,”112 without explicit reference to climate-induced displacement,
these instruments fail to address the multidimensional consequences of climate change and the unique impacts it can have on
human displacement.113 As a result, both the OAU Convention and
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees fall short as resources to address the unique protection needs of CDPs.114
2.

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and
Kampala Convention

Both the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“Guiding Principles”)115 and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (“Kampala Convention”)116 offer a broader scope of
protection for displaced peoples by recognizing climate-related
events as potential causes for displacement.117 Compared to the
OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, the
Guiding Principles and Kampala Convention are regional instruments that have greater potential to offer protection for the rights
of CDPs.

111.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 35.
112.
OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 74, at art. 1, ¶ 2; see also
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, supra note 105, at art. 3, ¶ 3.
113.
See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 32.
114.
Id. at 35–36.
115.
U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights Fifty-Fourth
Session, Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M.
Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998),
https://perma.cc/EC54-NR58 [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
116.
African Union, African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (“Kampala Convention”), Oct.
23, 2009, at pmbl. (entered into force Dec. 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/QLK4-PS2U
[hereinafter Kampala Convention].
117.
Williams, supra note 19, at 511; see also Cohen & Bradley, supra
note 13, at 96.
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Adopted in 1998, more than a decade after Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, the Guiding Principles have been recognized
as an “important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons[.]”118 The Guiding Principles define internally displaced peoples as those who:
[H]ave been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or humanmade disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized State border.119

As stated within this definition, the Guiding Principles recognize natural disasters as a potential cause for displacement.120
Moreover, Principle 6 of the Guiding Principles states “[e]very human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home[,]”121 and affirms that this
protection includes those who have been displaced by disasters.122
As a result, the Guiding Principles affirm recognition and can provide rights-based protection for internally displaced CDPs.123 By
incorporating refugee law into international humanitarian law
and human rights law, “[t]he [Guiding] Principles affirm that
“IDPs are entitled to the same human rights as other people in
their countries, and that governments in cooperation with international organizations are obliged to assist and protect them.”124
Over a decade after the adoption of the Guiding Principles, the
Kampala Convention reinforced the Guiding Principles and
adopted the same definition for internal displacement.125 Like the
118.
Williams, supra note 19, at 511.
119.
Guiding Principles supra note 113.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 6.
122.
Id. at 6–7.
123.
Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 99.
124.
Id.
125.
Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, The Kampala Convention and Environmentally Induced Displacement in Africa, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION
INTERSESSIONAL WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
AND MIGRATION 4 (2011), https://perma.cc/7M7R-C4NJ; see Kampala Convention
supra note 114.
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Guiding Principles, the Kampala Convention, adopted in 2009, recognizes the implications that natural disasters can have on human
displacement.126 However, unlike the Guiding Principles, the Kampala Convention also acknowledges and explicitly makes references to climate change as a cause of displacement.127 Article 5 of
the Kampala Convention recognizes that states have an obligation
to “take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change.”128 Recognized as a binding instrument in African states, the Kampala Convention provides that states are
responsible to protect those who are displaced by the implications
of climate change.129
Thus, the Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention offer unique legal protection because these instruments strive to tailor international legal standards to the special needs of IDPs while
establishing protection obligations during all phases of displacement.130 These regional frameworks have the potential to provide
protection for CDPs who have been internally displaced.131 Not
only do they focus on the rights of those who are internally displaced, but they also explicitly include those who have been displaced by natural disasters and climate change.132
Although both of these regional instruments have potential to
protect CDPs who are internally displaced, it would be of no use to
the Teitiota family and other island nation residents who find
themselves crossing borders to seek refuge.133 While the majority
of CDPs find themselves internally displaced during the initial
phases of displacement, the interplay between sudden-onset and
slow-onset climate events can result in cross-border migration.134

126.
Kampala Convention, supra note 120, at pmbl.
127.
Kampala Convention, supra note 120, at art. 5, ¶ 4; Abebe, supra
note 125, at 1.
128.
Kampala Convention, supra note 120, at art. 5, ¶ 4.
129.
Id. The Kampala Convention is the first regional instrument in the
world to impose this type of state obligation. APAP, supra note 9, at 7.
130.
Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 108–09.
131.
Id.
132.
See Guiding Principles, supra note 119, at 5; see also Kampala Convention, supra note 126, at art. 5, ¶ 4.
133.
See Williams, supra note 19, at 513.
134.
Id.
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The initial phases of climate-induced displacement may be triggered by a sudden-onset natural disaster; however, the fact that
there is no protection provided for those who have crossed an international border “fails to appreciate the true extent of the problem[.]”135 Extreme climate events such as saltwater intrusion and
the degradation of agricultural lands can lead to small island nations becoming completely uninhabitable.136 Such slow-onset
events will adversely impact the livelihoods of those that live on
the land, leaving them no choice but to seek refuge outside their
national borders.137 Thus, “internal displacement may well lead to
transborder displacement in the long term[.]”138
To use Tuvalu as an example, the Tuvalu government declared
the island in a state of emergency in 2011 due to severe water
shortages.139 These shortages will not only impact food security,
but also the livelihoods of those who live on the land.140 In 2019,
while visiting the island nation, U.N. Secretary General, António
Guterres described Tuvalu as one of the “frontrunners in the race
against the [global] climate emergency.”141 As these concerns
heighten, the land will soon become unsuitable for human habitation causing residents to flee.142
As a result, CDPs who are not “internally” displaced because
they have crossed an international border would not receive protection under the Guiding Principles or the Kampala Convention.

135.
Id.
136.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 7–8; see also Justin T. Locke, Climate
Change-Induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and Long-Term
Developments, 175 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 171, 178 (2009) (emphasizing that slow-onset
climate events have long-term consequences on food security, health, and natural
resources).
137.
Williams, supra note 19, at 513.
138.
Id.
139.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 7–8.
140.
Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and Forced Migration:
Making Sense of the Debate 1 (UNHCR: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit,
Working Paper No. 70, 2002), https://perma.cc/MTH7-T98R.
141.
’Save Tuvalu; Save the World’; UN Chief Echoes Rallying Cry from
Front Lines of a Global Climate Emergency, UN NEWS (May 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/N6UM-2JQQ.
142.
Id; see also Knodel, supra note 18, at 132 (stating that heightened
concerns related to security and livelihood will “reduce the ability of a nation and
culture to exist in their original homeland”).
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Consequently, there is no international framework that would provide cross-border CDPs rights-based protection they require.143 By
only offering protection to CDPs who are internally displaced,
these existing legal mechanisms offer a “piecemeal approach” to
protecting CDPs because they fail to appreciate the long-term consequences of climate change and the complex multi-layered phases
of climate displacement.144 The protection obligations established
under the Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention only
offer a temporary domestic solution to an otherwise increasing and
long-term international crisis.145
IV.

PROPOSED REGIONAL RESPONSES TO
CLIMATE-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

The fact that existing legal mechanisms fail to consider the
rights of CDPs does not mean that CDPs are any less worthy of
protection, nor does it delegitimize their claims for refuge.146 Instead, this fundamental void in legal protection illustrates that
CDPs are unique and must be considered through a different protection lens.147 As a result, this legal gap “recognizes and demonstrates the need for a more contemporary and innovative approach”148 for CDPs.
The multidimensional nature of climate displacement and the
difficulty in separating climate displacement from other socio-economic and political drivers further complicates attempts to formulate an overarching international agreement that effectively protects the rights of CDPs.149 Identifying the multi-layered phases of
143.
See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357.
144.
APAP, supra note 9, at 7; see also Williams, supra note 19, at 513.
145.
APAP, supra note 9, at 6–7; Williams, supra note 19, at 503; see also
UNHCR, The Warsaw Intern’l Mechanism For Loss And Damage Associated With
Climate Change Impacts, Task Force on Displacement Activity II.4, Mapping of
Existing International and Regional Guidance and Tools on Averting, Minimizing, Addressing and Facilitating Durable Solutions to Displacement Related to the
Adverse Impacts of Climate Change, at 45 (Aug. 2018) [hereinafter Warsaw Task
Force] (acknowledging that existing legal instruments fail to consider the longterm consequences of climate change because they “focus on the present and immediate future, with relatively short-term time horizons”).
146.
See Williams, supra note 19, at 509; see also Statement at Nansen
Conference, supra note 92.
147.
Williams, supra note 19, at 509; see also Hill, supra note 67, at 190.
148.
Williams, supra note 19, at 509.
149.
Id. at 512–13.
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climate displacement will depend on each state’s particular vulnerabilities and their capacities to address climate displacement.150
Thus, the creation of a “one-size-fits-all” international approach to
addressing climate displacement would not adequately protect the
unique rights of CDPs.151 Instead, what is needed are carefully
crafted regional solutions that are capable of acknowledging the
particular needs of states and CDPs.
This Part proposes solutions to this need for more regional approaches to address climate displacement. First, it highlights the
value of regional solutions and provides an example of an existing
and effective regional framework. It then explores the unique role
that UNCHR can play in the creation of regional approaches and
recommends an innovative funding option that can support states
in the development of regional climate displacement policies.
A. Proposal for “Bottom-Up” Reform
1.

The Value of Regional Solutions

In a speech delivered to the United Nations Development Programme in September 2018, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres acknowledged the multidimensional nature of climate-induced displacement and recognized the critical need to not only
address sudden-onset climate events, but also underlying slow-onset events.152 However, due to its multi-layered consequences, “climate change remains controversial given its cross-cutting reach
from environmental and social impacts, through to economic and
political policy[.]”153
Recently, there have been a number of international initiatives that recognize the interlinkages between climate change and

150.
151.

Hill, supra note 67, at 198–99.
JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2012).
152.
See generally António Guterres, U.N. Sec’y-Gen., Secretary-General’s Remarks on Climate Change [as delivered] (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://perma.cc/FL6D-U3FV.
153.
Williams, supra note 19, at 517.
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displacement.154 For example, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (“Global Compact”), adopted on December 10, 2018 and developed under the United Nations, is an
“intergovernmentally negotiated agreement” which seeks “to cover
all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner.”155 The Global Compact refers to sudden-onset
and slow-onset climate events and recognizes these events as
causes of forced displacement.156
Although the Global Compact was formally adopted in 2018,
its commitments are non-binding and have yet to be implemented.157 Moreover, despite its passive recognition of climate-related events, there is yet to be any mention of how this instrument
will assist states in addressing climate displacement at a regional
level.158 Thus, when it comes to international agreements “there is
a risk that a one-size-fits-all response could downplay the cultural

154.
See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 5 (referring to a
number of recent international initiatives and agreements including the Sustainable Development Goals, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the
World Humanitarian Summit, and the New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants).
155.
Global Compact for Migration, U.N. REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS,
https://perma.cc/38YG-R3JY.
156.
Global Compact for Migration, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
and Regular Migration, at 9, 12 (July 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8H3K-V39A; see
also Carolyn Beeler, UN Compact Recognizes Climate Change as Driver of Migration for First Time, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Dec. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/9K9B-8TQA
(stating that the Global Compact is recognized as the first global agreement towards a common approach to international migration).
157.
Global Compact on Migration Formally Adopted in Marrakech, THE
N. AFRICA POST (Dec. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/7X98-9SCJ; see also General Assembly Officially Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering,
UN NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/PBF8-FCRU.
158.
SARAH OPITZ STAPLETON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND
DISPLACEMENT: THE NEED FOR A RISK-INFORMED AND COHERENT APPROACH 27
(2017), https://perma.cc/27ZC-B6JE; see also Tim McDonnell, The Refugees The
World Barely Pays Attention To, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/R3PK-B6TM (statement of Nina Hall) (“[T]he language in the
compacts is too vague to spur much progress. . . neither compact will be legally
binding.”) (statement of Steve Trent) (“The global compacts are a start, but it’s
clear that they’re not enough.”); Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at 44 (stating that although there are several international instruments that recognize the
inherent link between the implications of climate change and human displacement, “relatively few of them are fully dedicated to the issue of averting, minimizing, addressing, and/or facilitating durable solutions to displacement related to
climate change and disaster”).
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and livelihood needs of displaced communities and local knowledge
bases for adaptation.”159
Therefore, a regional approach is needed to address climateinduced displacement.160 The ability of a community to recover
from both sudden and slow-onset implications of climate change
will depend on that particular community’s resilience and coping
capacity.161 As such, each state will have its own “tipping point”162
and will experience the impacts of climate change differently based
on the resources and protections in place within each state.163
While climate change impacts are international in scope and transboundary in nature, the immediate impacts will be experienced at
a regional level.164
A bottom-up approach would allow for a more inclusive process, giving regions the opportunity to gauge the varying capacities
of each state and analyze the climate-related concerns specific to
each region.165 Given the regional impact of climate change, focus
should instead be placed on strengthening national policies.166 This
approach would provide states with the chance to not only work at
their own pace, but to also be flexible when adopting and implementing policies.167 As a result, the rights of CDPs are better recognized and protected when their needs are considered through a
more localized framework.168 The UNHCR further endorses this
regional approach.169 When speaking on behalf of the agency in
159.
McAdam, supra note 151, at 7; see also Warsaw Task Force, supra
note 145, at 45 (stating that existing international instruments inadequately address the unique human rights risks that climate displaced populations face, and
that more regional policies are needed that encourage “migration with dignity”
and that are sensitive to the cultural heritage and various capacities of states).
160.
Williams, supra note 19, at 512 (advancing a more bottom-up approach to strengthen national policies); Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at
47.
161.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 14.
162.
Id. at 33 n.136.
163.
See generally id.; see also Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at
45; Knodel, supra note 18, at 133 (noting that an island’s state of vulnerability
can depend on its “existing economic, social, and physical conditions”).
164.
Williams, supra note 19, at 518.
165.
Id. at 521.
166.
Id. at 520–23; Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at 45–46.
167.
Williams, supra note 19, at 511.
168.
See id.
169.
Alister Doyle, World Needs Refugee Re-Think for Climate Victims:
U.N., REUTERS (June 6, 2011), https://perma.cc/5P68-KXZG.
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2011, Antonio Guterres stated that when combating climate-induced displacement, the “primary responsibility for the protection
and well-being of affected populations will . . . rest with the states
concerned.”170
Consequently, this bottom-up approach becomes “a system
that instead recognizes the idea of climate change displacement at
an international level, while leaving the detail of agreement and
degree of engagement to national policies.”171 Regional approaches,
such as the Nansen Initiative, and its successor, the Platform on
Disaster Displacement, allow states to identify these tipping points
and encourage states to work together to create action plans that
enhance resilience.172
2.

Leveraging Existing Instruments to Develop an
Effective Regional Framework

The Nansen Initiative and the Platform on Disaster Displacement demonstrate the value of regional policies and their potential
in framing a bottom-up rights-based protection regime.173 Established in 2012, the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced CrossBorder Displacement (“Nansen”) was a three-year intergovernmental strategy led by the governments of Norway and Switzerland.174 Using a “bottom-up consultative approach,”175 Nansen
sought to “build consensus on key principles and elements to address the protection and assistance needs of persons displaced
across borders in the context of disasters, including the adverse
effects of climate change.”176 Within its three-year span, Nansen
engaged in seven sub-regional consultations involving regions
throughout the world.177 These consultations resulted in the creation of the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced
170.
Id.
171.
Williams, supra note 19, at 520.
172.
Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to The Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 39 U. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 1518, 1520 (2017).
173.
Id.
174.
THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF CROSSBORDER DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
VOLUME 1 6 (2015) [hereinafter NANSEN INITIATIVE].
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
See McAdam, supra note 172, at 1520–21.
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Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change
(“Agenda”).178
Endorsed by 109 governments, the purpose of the Agenda is to
offer a comprehensive “toolbox of concrete measures and effective
practices that governments can implement now to avoid displacement . . . and to protect and assist those who are displaced.”179
Through these measures, the Agenda calls on states to place more
focus on climate adaptation plans and to strengthen disaster risk
reduction measures.180
While Nansen formally reached the end of its three-year mandate in 2015, it inspired the creation of its successor, the Platform
on Disaster Displacement (“PDD”).181 The PDD, which launched in
May 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit, continues to advance the objectives of the Agenda originally created by Nansen.182
The purpose of PDD is to assist states in implementing the Agenda
by forming state-led partnerships with various stakeholders and
agencies, including the UNHCR.183
Like its predecessor, PDD embraces the multidimensional nature of climate displacement.184 By acknowledging the value of regional solutions, PDD aims to address the voids in existing refugee
law.185 Rather than endorse a top-down, one-size-fits-all approach,
PDD “focuses on the integration of effective practices by states and
(sub-)regional organizations into their own normative frameworks
in accordance with their specific situations.”186 As part of its com-

178.
Id. at 1524.
179.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 10 (internal quotations omitted).
180.
Id.
181.
McAdam, supra note 172, at 1520.
182.
Our
Response,
PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT,
https://perma.cc/TLA3-J3HU [hereinafter Platform on Disaster Displacement Response].
183.
See Why UNHCR is Taking Action on Climate Change Displacement, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (2017),
https://perma.cc/6PRQ-75SB (noting UNHCR’s endorsement of support for the
Platform on Disaster Displacement).
184.
Walter Kälin, The Nansen Initiative: Building Consensus on Displacement in Disaster Contexts, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 5, 5 (2015).
185.
McAdam, supra note 172, at 1525.
186.
PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, COORDINATION UNIT,
UPDATE ON PROGRESS SINCE THE WORLD HUMANITARIAN SUMMIT 1 (2017),
https://perma.cc/S8X4-CNLV.
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prehensive toolbox, the Agenda offers resources for states to provide humanitarian visas, as well as temporary protection and stays
of deportation arrangements for CDPs.187 The Agenda recognizes
the adverse implications of slow-onset climate events, and for this
reason, recommends that states should provide voluntary migration opportunities so that residents are given the choice to relocate
in anticipation of future environmental harm.188
The Agenda also recognizes that a holistic approach must be
taken when advancing voluntary migration opportunities to ensure that these options are attainable to all CDPs.189 Not all voluntary migration options will provide the necessary protection that
CDPs need, and some maintain strict eligibility requirements that
may exclude many CDPs.190 For example, New Zealand’s Pacific
Access Category (“PAC”) is a voluntary migration and resettlement
program.191 Recognized as a special “immigration deal”192 between
several Pacific island nations and New Zealand, PAC provides permanent residence annually to a set number of residents from Fiji,
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Kirbati.193 However, to be eligible for PAC, one
must not only have a minimum level of English, but must also meet
a minimum income level and basic health requirements.194 These
requirements were designed to ensure that once relocated, individuals would be able to sustain employment, and thus, a livelihood.195
Although PAC has supported many island nation residents and
families seeking to relocate and resettle elsewhere, not everyone
will be able to meet the strict PAC requirements.196
187.
McAdam, supra note 172, at 1524; see W.H., Why Climate Migrants
Do Not Have Refugee Status, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://perma.cc/9YA3-RF96.
188.
McAdam, supra note 172, at 1543.
189.
Kälin, supra note 184, at 5.
190.
Williams, supra note 19, at 516.
191.
McAdam, supra note 172, at 1544.
192.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH AUSTRALIA, CLIMATE JUSTICE: A FAIR SHARE
OF THE ATMOSPHERE 19 (2006), https://perma.cc/QZ3S-PDJ9.
193.
McAdam, supra note 172, at 1544.
194.
See John Gibson et al., How Pro-Poor is the Selection of Seasonal
Migrant Workers from Tonga Under New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer Program?, 23 PACIFIC ECON. BULL. 187, 197 (2008).
195.
See id. at 197–98.
196.
Knodel, supra note 18, at 158 (“PAC remains a limited and structured migration program rather than a program to address climate-displaced persons.”); Williams, supra note 19, at 515 (noting the protection gaps of PAC due to
its strict eligibility requirements that often exclude many residents).
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Since the Teitiota family was returned to Kiribati after their
claim for refugee status was denied, Ioane Teitiota has been unable
to find employment.197 Without basic income, CDPs like the Teitiota family would not be eligible for voluntary migration under
PAC. Consequently, the PDD recognizes that voluntary migration
opportunities must be addressed with care as their effectiveness
will depend on the varying capacities of each state.198 By understanding the regional challenges of states, PDD recognizes the
challenges that can arise when creating voluntary migration opportunities.199 As a result, PDD encourages more inclusive, sustainable migration opportunities, so that programs like PAC do not
leave people behind.200
Nansen is an example of the product of regional collaborative
efforts to address climate-induced displacement.201 The use of regional consultations and collaborations allowed Nansen to create a
broad Agenda that is still applicable and effective on a regional
level.202 Its successor, PDD, continues to advance the goals of Nansen; these state-led initiatives “harness[] regional cooperation between states and build[] on existing geopolitical, economic, cultural, and environmental relationships that already exist within
many regional frameworks.”203 Such an approach may encourage
good practices between states where ideas and initiatives can be
shared and exchanged for the benefit of the entire region.204

197.
McDonald, supra note 43.
198.
APAP, supra note 9, at 3 (“Ensuring that climate-induced planned
resettlement is dealt with humanely and effectively will require careful policy
planning . . . ”).
199.
McAdam, supra note 18, at 10–11.
200.
See Hill, supra note 67, at 188 (stating that governance mechanisms must be applied equitably and policies and practices must “ensure interest
representation, inclusiveness, [and] equality . . . ”).
201.
Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at 47.
202.
See McAdam, supra note 18, at 9–10.
203.
Williams, supra note 19, at 524; see also Hill, supra note 67, at 189
(stating that if governance frameworks fail to take cultural considerations into
account, they “will inevitably result in imposed ‘solutions’ that may lead to all
manners of unintended consequences[]”).
204.
Williams, supra note 19, at 512; see also Knodel, supra note 18, at
173.
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B. The UNHCR and Potential Funding Avenues
1.

The Role of the UNHCR

Although the UNHCR may be reluctant to incorporate CDPs
into a Convention refugee protection framework, and instead endorses regional initiatives, this does not mean that it absolves itself
from carrying any responsibility in the protection of CDPs. As U.N.
Secretary-General António Guterres noted, the “UNHCR is not a
migration management agency and does not want to become one.
But to be able to fulfil our mandate, we must recognize the mixed
nature of many present-day population flows.”205 Considering that
climate-induced displacement is a present-day migration concern,
there is a potential opportunity for UNHCR to play an important
protective role.206
Although the agency’s mandate focuses on reactive protection
measures, the agency nonetheless recognizes the multi-layered
challenges that accompany climate-induced displacement and is
aware of CDPs’ current and emerging protection needs.207 Therefore, “the key is to find ways in which UNHCR’s expertise can add
value to, and complement, the roles of other actors so as to enhance
protection . . . ”208
With almost 70 years of knowledge and practical experience in
protecting the rights of refugees, the UNHCR has potential to play
a critical role in addressing CDP protection, both in a normative
and operational sense.209 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that
“its credibility and authority will allow it to develop pro-active and
innovative initiatives . . . ”210 As a result, UNHCR can provide
“‘value-added’ [support], where its experience and expertise have
much to offer . . . ”211 Through offering this experience, one proposal has been to call on the UNHCR to assist in developing a
United Nations Special Rapporteur with a specific focus on climate
205.
Guterres, supra note 1.
206.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 26; see also Berringer,
supra note 65, at 214 (noting the potential “unique” role UNCHR can play in addressing climate displacement).
207.
See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 30.
208.
Id. at 31.
209.
Id. at 24, 26.
210.
Id. at 37.
211.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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displacement.212 A UN Special Rapporteur can assist states by ensuring proper oversight and coordination in the development of regional policies.213
UNHCR also has a critical role to play in increasing global
awareness of the urgency of addressing climate displacement. To
fulfill this objective, the agency must start by working towards normalizing appropriate terminology used to characterize peoples affected by climate-induced displacement.214 Despite its reluctance
to adopt CDPs within the conventional legal framework, it is still
critical that international policies and initiatives “at the very least
acknowledge the link between climate change and displacement
and recognize the resulting problem.”215 Only after effective and
appropriate terminology become normalized within the global context can the rights of CDPs be properly recognized within effective
regional legal frameworks.216
2.

Creating a Climate Displacement Category Under
the Green Climate Fund

With the help of UNHCR, climate-induced displacement can
become recognized terminology within the language of refugee
rights protection.217 This recognition can help to further legitimize
regional approaches initiated by states.218 For these regional
frameworks to come into fruition, collaboration between the
UNHCR and states must occur to formulate a comprehensive and
sustainable funding mechanism. Although this type of financing
instrument may not currently exist, states may look to other funding models for inspiration. The GCF assists in financing mitigation
and adaptation projects related to climate change and is the result

212.
ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND., BEYOND BORDERS: OUR CHANGING CLIMATE
– ITS ROLE IN CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT 6 (Nov. 2, 2017).
213.
Id. at 5.
214.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 28.
215.
Williams, supra note 19, at 520; see also Berringer, supra note 65,
at 202 (suggesting that the link between climate change and displacement needs
to be recognized and integrated into international and regional policies).
216.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 29; see also Knodel, supra note 18, at 131 (advancing the need to “develop a legally recognized definition”
of CDPs).
217.
Id.
218.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 29.
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of effective collaboration between states and various UN agencies.219 Although it does not currently have a specific fund that addresses climate displacement, the GCF may have potential to assist in creating such a fund.
The GCF was formally adopted at the 2011 United Nations
Climate Change Conference in Durban, Africa.220 Under the mandate of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”), the GCF was established to create an innovative and
ambitious funding mechanism that seeks to “reshape the global architecture of climate change financing.”221 Recognized as “a legally
independent institution,”222 the GCF is supported by an independent Secretariat and is headed by the Green Climate Board, which
is comprised of 24 members.223 Within the Board, there is an equal
composition of members from developed and developing country
parties.224 Among the developing country members, the GCF’s
mandate guarantees representation by relevant UN regional
groupings, as well as, representation from small island nations and
least developed countries.225 From the Board’s composition alone,
the GCF focuses on regional approaches to address the impacts of
climate change.
As the GCF’s interim trustee, the World Bank is responsible
for holding the Fund’s financial assets and preparing its financial
records and statements.226 The World Bank does not make deci-

219.
Green Climate Fund, supra note 23.
220.
Id.
221.
Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner, The Green Climate Fund and
the Future of Environmental Governance 4 (Earth System Governance, Working
Paper No. 16, 2011); see also Green Climate Fund, supra note 219. At the G7 Summit in June 2015, leaders emphasized GCF’s role as a key institution for global
climate
finance.
Resource
Mobilization,
GREEN
CLIMATE
FUND,
https://perma.cc/2ESM-4A9B.
222.
Liane Schalatek et al., Heinrich Böell Stiftung & Overseas Dev.
Inst., The Green Climate Fund, Climate Finance Fundamentals, Brief 11, at 1
(Nov. 2018); see Who We Are: Secretariat, GREEN CLIMATE FUND,
https://perma.cc/6YMC-GQUD.
223.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, Dec. 3/CP.17, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, annex I, ¶ 9 (Dec. 11, 2011).
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Id. ¶ 24.
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sions on behalf of the GCF; instead, it administers the Fund’s assets in accordance with the Green Climate Board’s decisions.227
The GCF’s first “resource mobilization” period began in 2014 and
is still in process, receiving pledges on an ongoing basis.228 The
Fund’s main investments are provided in the form of grants and
loans that are primarily funded by developed country parties to the
UNFCCC.229 As of May 2018, GCF has received financial pledges
from 43 state governments and nine developing country parties.230
Since 2014, the total amount of signed pledges raised has equaled
10.3 billion dollars, with the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, and France as its top donors.231 Since its inception, the GCF
has made significant progress in mobilizing resources and working
towards investing in combating climate change through regional
mitigation and adaptation projects. For example, by the end of
2017, the GCF amassed over $633 million in resources that have
aided in implementing 19 regional projects worldwide.232
The GCF Readiness and Preparatory Support Program
(“RPSP”) was established in 2014 to help developing countries gain
greater access to GCF resources.233 Any country party may apply
to the RPSP; however, over half of funding allocated for the RPSP
is reserved for developing countries identified by UNFCCC as being particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change.234 These countries include less developed countries, small
island states, and African States.235 RPSP provides up to $3 million
per country and up to $1 million per year to assist states in creating national adaptation plans, and through the RPSP, the GCF

227.
Id. ¶ 25.
228.
Green Climate Fund, supra note 23. The first phase of the resource
mobilization period began in 2014 and continued through the end of 2018. Id.
229.
See id.
230.
GREEN CLIMATE FUND, STATUS OF PLEDGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
MADE
TO
THE
GREEN CLIMATE FUND: PLEDGE TRACKER (2018),
https://perma.cc/5EXV-8A3U (providing a detailed chart of pledges and contributions GCF has received as of May 8, 2018.)
231.
See id.
232.
Green Climate Fund, supra note 23.
233.
Readiness and Preparatory Support Program, supra note 24.
234.
Id.
235.
Id.; see also Knodel, supra note 18, at 143 (noting that compared to
developed countries, developing countries experience “asymmetrical impacts of
climate change”).
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aims to “support effective, country-driven adaptation activities”236
that consider the unique vulnerabilities and capacities of each
state to address climate change.237 As of 2019, the RPSP has
worked with 135 countries and is “set to become the largest global
support programme made available to developing countries to enhance access to climate finance in support of their efforts to combat
climate change.”238
Through a focus on regional support and representation, the
GCF has placed important emphasis on investing in national adaptions plans to combat climate change, particularly within vulnerable countries, such as small island states.239 Additionally, the
RPSP ensures that vulnerable states have access to GCF’s resources and multilateral funds.240 Although the RPSP provides this
additional support for states, it has yet to recognize climate displacement as a focus area in need of funding. With such a comprehensive climate change funding mechanism already in place, the
RPSP offers promise to provide a funding platform that can assist
states in developing adaptation plans that address climate-induced
displacement.241 Thus, this Article proposes the RPSP designate a
portion of its financial resources to assist states in developing national adaption plans focused on addressing climate displacement.

236.
GREEN CLIMATE FUND, GCF IN BRIEF: ADAPTATION PLANNING 1 (2018),
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239.
Green Climate Fund, supra note 23; see generally Project FP091,
GREEN CLIMATE FUND, https://perma.cc/XQT4-REMQ (illustrating GCF mitigation and adaptation project focused on strengthening policies on water supply
management in South Tawara (capital of Kiribati)).
240.
See The Funds, GREEN CLIMATE FUNDS, https://perma.cc/F8F4RGEF (providing an up to date list of GCF’s multilateral climate funds); see also
Knodel, supra note 18, at 148 (acknowledging that “financial capacity is another
major limiting factor for developing nations trying to adapt to the adverse impacts
of climate change”).
241.
See Berringer, supra note 65, at 214 (identifying “migration as an
appropriate adaption measure”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3

34

2019]

Climate Displaced Peoples in the 21st Century

295

By creating a designated climate displacement funding category with the RPSP, this proposal can open the door to building of
partnerships between UNHCR and UNFCCC and can encourage
further collaboration between these agencies and regional states.
Along with an appointed UN Special Rapporteur on climate displacement to aid in coordination, a designated climate displacement fund under the auspices of the GCF would provide a strong
foundation to support states’ efforts to develop effective regional
initiatives that seek to protect the rights of CDPs.
V.

CONCLUSION

The implications of climate change pose significant threats to
populations worldwide.242 With every second that passes, yet another person is displaced by a climate-related event.243 Despite this
reality, there is no effective legal framework to protect CDPs.244
Consequently, CDPs like the Teitiota family have no legal mechanisms to protect their rights. Existing legal frameworks are inadequate as they neglect to address the unique challenges CDPs face
and fail to recognize the complex multidimensional nature of climate induced displacement.
The impacts of climate change will be felt at a regional level,
and thus, what is needed are regional approaches to address this
complex form of human displacement.245 States are better
equipped to understand the unique challenges of climate displacement and can better appreciate the diverse and varying vulnerabilities of CDPs.246 This bottom-up approach to addressing climateinduced displacement has potential to encourage collaboration
among states, without causing states to feel the pressure to conform to a top-down “one-size-fits-all” approach.247
Along with the experienced oversight of the UNHCR, there is
potential for states to collaborate with funding initiatives like the
Green Climate Fund. By crafting a designated funding category
under an instrument like the GCF, states will have a platform from
242.
See Urry, supra note 2, at 52.
243.
RELIEFWEB, supra note 8.
244.
Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357.
245.
Williams, supra note 19, at 518.
246.
Id.
247.
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 17; see also McAdam,
supra note 172, at 1520.
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which to advance and implement effective regional policies to address climate displacement. Thus, through regional-based initiatives, small island nation residents like the Teitiota family, and
CDPs everywhere would receive the legal recognition and rightsbased protection they rightfully deserve.
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